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Prototypes, Genres, and Concepts:  
Travelling with Narratives 
 
Matti Hyvärinen 
University of Tampere 
 
 
The “narrative turn” is (too) often understood as a celebratory term indicating 
the growing importance and popularity of narrative studies. This article 
elaborates the merits of a more critical approach to the history of narrative 
theory. By discussing David Herman’s idea of prototypical narrativity, the 
article suggests that there has been a longstanding contradiction between the 
abstract and universal notion of narrative and the narrow and particular 
Proppian prototype of narrativity. The article argues that “narrative” has 
primarily travelled either as a concept, metaphor, or prototype rather than as a 
full narrative theory or method. Instead of one, unitary narrative turn, the 
article argues for the existence of several diverse and partly contrasting 
narrative turns. The recent experiential turn in narrative studies and the 
consequent change of the prototype of narrative gives a strong impetus for a 
new wave of cross-disciplinary narrative theory. 
 
  
 More than twenty years ago, when I embarked on the study of 
narrative theory, I felt profoundly perplexed by the contrasting attitudes 
towards narrative suggested by different authors. During the years that 
followed this initial confusion, I have learned once and again that the 
mere usage of the same word, “narrative,” does not always indicate the 
usage of the same or equal concept of narrative. This contradiction is 
already obvious in the famous volume On Narrative, edited by W. J. T. 
Mitchell (1981). Such contributors to the volume as Hayden White, Paul 
Ricoeur, and Barbara Herrnstein Smith, for example, locate their 
“narratives” differently and display different attitudes towards narrative.  
 There is, of course, much irony and difficulty invested in any 
attempt at writing a conceptual history of narrative, as I am supposed to 
do. Can such a fuzzy network of influences and retroactive movements 
across disciplinary boundaries, different academic cultures, and different 
fields of life ever be caught within a single story? Brian Richardson 
(2000) convincingly argues that the “actual evolution and development of 
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narrative theory cannot begin to be grafted onto the master narrative of 
critical theory as told by the poststructuralists. Indeed, the story of 
modern narrative theory does not fit well into the frame of any narrative 
history” (p. 172). I accept the worry and the criticism of the master 
narrative, yet at the same time I cannot fail to recognize a certain 
circularity in the argument. What do we think about “narrative” if we 
decide in advance that it is impossible to narrate this particular conceptual 
history? Richardson correctly criticises the representation of the history of 
narrative theory as a progression of narrative schools in the style of the 
old history of ideas (see also McHale, 2005). In order to complicate the 
picture, and open up some of its contingencies, I discuss the travels of 
“narrative” from the perspectives of the concept, metaphor, and prototype 
of narrative. In thinking about the possibilities of narrative in 
historiography in general, I tend to emphasize the necessary move from 
the structuralist textuality into contextual storytelling (Alber and 
Fludernik, 2010). The purpose of my narrative histories is not the search 
for fixed closures but an invitation to telling new stories from new 
perspectives. 
 
Universality Contra Prototype(s) 
 
 David Herman (2009a) has recently suggested a new and 
obviously productive approach to defining narrative from the perspective 
of prototype in contrast to the more conventional strategy of identifying 
the minimal criteria for narrativity. (Tammi, 2006, and Richardson, 2000, 
provide useful summaries of bare minimum definitions). Herman’s 
proposal helps the understanding of the history of narrative in two 
separate ways. First of all, it helps to foreground the profound 
transformations between structuralist and postclassical theories of 
narrative. In this article, secondly, I suggest another use of the same idea. 
I believe that a powerful prototype of narrative has been operative since 
the first narrative turn in literature. My tentative claim is that there has 
been an unresolved contradiction between an abstract and universal 
concept of narrative (Barthes, 1977; Fludernik, 2005; Ryan, 2005; 
Hyvärinen, 2006) and a particularly narrow prototype of narrative. If I am 
right, narrative theory has been a game played with two different packs of 
cards.  
 Cognitive theory assumes that prototypes simplify our thinking 
processes on the level of categorizations. According to the often used 
example, we tend to think of such birds as sparrows and robins as 
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representing the category of bird much better than emus or penguins 
(Herman, 2009a, 12–15). Within the concept of bird we can thus have 
both prototypical (robin) and marginal (penguin) cases. In the case of 
narrative, we can also envision different narrative genres (resembling the 
species in the case of birds) which can overlap or be marginal as regards 
the prototypes. My question, in this article, could thus be reformulated 
with the help of this analogy: have we earlier understood something, 
metaphorically speaking, like ostriches and emus as the prototypical cases 
of narrativity? The changed understanding of prototypical narrativity 
changes, of course, the use of the concept, but not necessarily on the level 
of the “bare minimum” definitions. 
 Let us begin from the middle of the story, at a decisive juncture 
where preceding interest in narrative is translated into the language of a 
narrative programme—the first narrative turn in literature and humanities. 
The French structuralist literary critic and theorist, Roland Barthes 
(1977), opens his celebrated article “Introduction to the Structural 
Analysis of Narratives,” first published in 1966, with a number of brave 
claims:  
 
The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and 
foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed 
amongst different substances—as though any material were fit to 
receive man’s stories. Able to be carried by articulated language, 
spoken or written, fixed or moving … narrative is present in myth, 
legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, 
mime, painting … stained glass windows, cinema, comics, news 
item, conversation.… All classes, all human groups, have their 
narratives, enjoyment of which is very often shared by men with 
different, even opposing, cultural backgrounds. (p. 79)  
 
 The claim above is not simply that narrative is everywhere. The 
qualitatively new, almost revolutionary assertion is that the very concept 
of narrative is both present and relevant across these diverse fields of 
human life, arts, and communication. Helpfully, Barthes already 
emphasizes that narrative is “first and foremost a prodigious variety of 
genres” (emphasis added). Before this first narrative turn, “narrative” as a 
concept was used within a much more local setting, and it did not have 
such a theoretically prestigious place within conceptual hierarchies. This 
side of the story is fairly well known and often rehearsed. My proposal is 
that in contrast to this universalistic and abstract concept, a very particular 
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and generically narrow prototype of narrativity has guided the 
development of narrative theory, and that the aspect of genre differences 
has largely been neglected. In Barthes, this change takes place through his 
choice of deductive method before proper analysis of the multiplicity of 
narrative genres. In arguing for the deductive method, Barthes (1977) first 
resorts to Saussurean linguistics and then invites the shadow of the 
prototype: 
 
[The] Russian Formalists, Propp and Lévi-Strauss, have taught us to 
recognize the following dilemma: either a narrative is merely a 
rambling collection of events, in which case nothing can be said 
about it … or else it shares with other narratives a common structure 
which is open to analysis, no matter how much patience its 
formulation requires. (p. 80) 
 
 At this theoretical juncture, the Proppian fairy tales offer 
themselves as a narrative prototype. According to the widely shared 
understanding, the whole narrative turn in the humanities—first in 
literature and anthropology—was launched after and as a reaction to the 
first English translation of Vladimir Propp’s (1968) Morphology of the 
Folktale in 1958 (Dundes, 1968). This book inspired Claude Levi-Strauss 
and other French structuralists, and it later generated a whole thread of 
theories on story grammars and plot structures (Propp, 1984; Pavel, 1988; 
Ronen, 1990). However, a closer look at the book itself hardly reveals 
any explicit theory of narrative at all. Furthermore, even the term 
“narrative” only has a secondary position among the wonder-tale, 
functions, roles, and theory of fairy tale. Propp himself later protested 
even against the term “folktale,” claiming that it was all too broad for his 
study about wonder tales. Morphology first needed a radical conceptual 
translation before turning into a classic of narrative theory (Propp, 1984). 
Thomas Pavel (1988) considers this translation substantially misguided 
and believes that it fails to recognize the purposes of Propp’s own project 
correctly.  
 The particular problem in reading Propp that I would like to 
highlight concerns the issue of genre. The Russian wonder tales were 
orally transmitted. As examples of highly conventional popular art, they 
were exceedingly sequential, chronological, and closed. A wonder-tale 
cannot leave the end of a story hanging; a wonder-tale cannot quite 
experiment with the form, content, or the ways the story ends. The limits 
of complexity are equally strictly set since the story must be easily 
              NARRATIVE WORKS 2(1)          14
   
 
remembered and recounted, once and again. As for the themes, the world 
of the wonder tales is equally closed. The stories cannot introduce 
problems of the market economy or same-sex marriages, or other new 
phenomena. From beginning to end, they are about Tsars, princesses, 
heroes, witches, and other characters from romantic quest stories. They 
are heavily mythic. For these reasons, a wonder-tale radically deviates 
both from the properly oral everyday narratives and artistically 
experimenting forms such as novel, short story, or film. The linguist and 
literary scholar Monika Fludernik (1996) characterizes these stories aptly 
as pseudo-oral (p.14). Barthes (1977) recognizes this problem by 
maintaining that “some narratives are heavily functional (such as 
folktales), while others on the contrary are heavily indicial” (p. 93), yet 
these exceptionally functional and formulaic narratives continually work 
as primary evidence of the relevance of such functions and deep 
structures.  
 Barthes declared that narrative is “a prodigious variety of genres”; 
nevertheless, the wonder tales were persistently received as prototypes of 
narrative rather than as a peculiar genre. The anthropologist Misia Landau 
(2001) summarizes this prototypical understanding in the following way: 
“From the point of view of structuralism, narrative can be presented as a 
string of functional slots or paradigms. The significance of Propp’s work, 
then, is that it provides a method which allows us to describe individual 
stories as variations on a basic narrative or deep structure” (p. 107). The 
sociologist Norman K. Denzin (1989) echoes this view: “A narrative as a 
story has a plot, a beginning, a middle, and an end.… A narrative relates 
events in a temporal, causal sequence” (p. 37). Partly because the 
semantic content in the wonder tales was less prominent than the 
recurrent form, it was understood that the study of the “story form” was 
the primary focus of narrative studies.  
 As Pavel (1988) observes, referring to Claude Bremond and Jean 
Verrier, Propp’s model “claims to apply … in fact to only one type of 
tale, namely No. 300 of the Aarne-Thomson classification—The Dragon 
Slayer. The morphology of only one tale has thus served as the 
foundation of narrative semiotics of all stories, indeed of all meaningful 
phenomena” (p. 600). The study of one particular wonder tale with one 
hundred examples, therefore, gave the “method” and impetus to study all 
other stories “as variations on a basic narrative or deep structure” 
(Landau, 2001, p. 107). Jerome Bruner (1987) characteristically suggests 
that ordinary life stories may display a similar recurrent form as the 
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wonder tales do, more precisely to “reveal a common formal structure 
across a wide variety of content” (pp. 16-17).  
 
From Prototype to Definition 
 
 The Barthesian idea of narrative was formulated in universal and 
abstract terms, encouraging the study of the prodigious variety of genres. 
However, the model study and prototype that inspired scholars, from 
structuralist narratologists to many sociologists, was based on an 
exceptionally narrow, closed, and formulaic genre. The ideas about 
narratives as closed sequences of events with conventional types of agents 
motivated scholars who worked with all kinds of different stories. For 
example, what legitimates the imposition of the language of Romance, 
with all the heroes, villains, and princesses, onto the study of ordinary 
everyday narration?  
 The incongruence between the abstract conception of narrative 
and the particularistic prototype of narrative seems to lead to interesting 
tensions. In terms of definitions, structuralist narratology seems to 
disregard the critical test of the Barthesian “prodigious variety of genres,” 
that is, to ask about relevant definitions from the perspective of different 
genres, and proceeds instead with the help of the Proppian prototype. The 
argument begins with the shared prototype, delves next into the presumed 
deep structure, and returns from there in a purified form of a grammar 
which is now theoretically resistant to all empirical genre differences. 
Seymour Chatman (1981), characteristically, writes in the epoch-making 
volume On Narrative, that “one of the most important observations to 
come out of narratology is that narrative itself is a deep structure quite 
independent of its medium” (p. 117). Despite the surface-level genre 
differences, the deep, prototypical narrative structure can prevail.  
 Following this prototype, the structuralist narratologists typically 
defined narrative more or less in terms of a sequence of events; saying for 
example that narrative is “the representation of at least two real or fictive 
events in a time sequence, neither of which presupposes or entails the 
other” (Prince, 1982, p. 49; see also Labov, 1972). The prototypical idea 
of narrative as a sequence of events was soon bolstered by formulations 
adopted from the Aristotelian theory of tragedy. While Aristotle quite 
explicitly discussed well-drafted tragedy, that is the arts, the triad of the 
beginning, middle, and end was soon transposed to narrative theory as the 
supposedly universal core definition of all narrativity—again an 
unwarranted move between distinct speech genres (see Hyvärinen et al., 
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2010). In social research, the prototype typically worked another way 
round. Relatively few social scientists have embarked on discussing the 
concept of narrative or story, suggesting that we already know them from 
social practice. Without a theoretical discussion on narrative, the inherited 
prototypes have of course more or less free and un-reflected access to the 
argumentation.  
 Hayden White (1981), in his celebrated essay in On Narrative, 
undertakes this whole journey from universalism to particular 
Aristotelianism. Narrative, in other words, is both universal and 
extremely particular at the same time. After beginning with Barthes’s 
universalist formulations, White continues that this “suggests that far 
from being one code among many that a culture may utilize for endowing 
experience with meaning, narrative is a metacode, a human universal on 
the basis of which transcultural messages about the nature of a shared 
reality can be transmitted” (p. 2).  
 It may require further discussion whether the term “code” above 
already suppresses the variety of genres into a deep, singular meaning. Be 
that as it may, White soon withdraws entirely from the universal and 
returns to the prototype. At the beginning of his last paragraph, 
questioning the value of narrativity “in the representation of real events,” 
he arrives at an interesting discussion. Indeed, he notes, “the notion that 
sequences of real events possess the formal attributes of the stories we tell 
about imaginary events could only have its origin in wishes, daydreams, 
reveries” (p. 23). This is surely a most self-evident argument. White 
seems be saying that it would be erroneous to impose Proppian sequences 
or literary forms on the past events. However, while the paragraph begins 
from the universal level (“the value of narrativity”), the second sentence 
is already on the level of the particular prototype. The claim says nothing 
at all about the stories we use to tell about real events. Such an argument 
is not required, thanks to the shared presupposition of the Proppian-cum-
Aristotelian prototype of narrative. Instead of addressing the tricky 
empirical questions of genre differences or genre blending, White takes 
the structuralist trip through narrative essence, and continues by asking: 
“Does the world really present itself to perception in the form of well-
made stories, with central subjects, proper beginnings, middles, and ends, 
and a coherence that permits us to see “the end” in every beginning?” (p. 
23; emphasis added). At this point, the whole Barthesian universalism has 
been replaced by Aristotelian particularism, with the help of the 
prototype. The variety of genres need not be addressed at all as far as the 
shared prototype provides the perspective into the “deep structure” and 
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“form” of narrative. The power of the one hundred wonder tales is 
enviable.  
 
The Four Narrative Turns 
 
 I suggest that instead of one, unitary narrative turn, it might be 
helpful to distinguish among at least four different turns (Hyvärinen, 
2010). My argument is constructionist rather than Aristotelian; the point 
is not rooted in categorical distinctions or in the exclusiveness of the 
model. The final number of turns does not even matter as long as the 
diversity of turns is recognized. The purpose of the exercise resides on the 
side of displaying important (dis)continuities and contingencies over and 
across the various narrative turns. The turns differ from each other as 
regards several key aspects, such as (1) timing; (2) research agendas and 
typical procedures; (3) attitudes towards narrative and narrative research; 
and possibly even (4) the success of the turn. My claim is not to disregard 
or downplay the existing interdisciplinary exchange but to argue that it 
has often been much more limited than proclaimed in more optimistic 
reports. However different the various turns have been, the Proppian 
prototype has been strong enough to persist throughout all of them.  
 In June 2003 I had a discussion with Mark Freeman on the issue 
of the narrative turn. We both located the turn in the early years of the 
1980s, following the publication of On Narrative (Mitchell, 1981). Mark 
even went on to locate the nexus of the turn in the University of Chicago, 
where Paul Ricoeur was teaching in those days. Jerome Bruner (1991), 
who uses the term “paradigm shift” instead of narrative turn, locates the 
phenomenon at the same point of time (p. 4).  
 However, David Herman et al. (2005) pose the whole issue 
differently in the introduction of the Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative 
Theory. They write that “the ‘narrative turn’ gained impetus from the 
development of the structuralist theories of narrative in France in the mid 
to late 1960s” (p. 1). Narrative was not, automatically or historically, 
even the key concept of literature. In France, the narrative turn in 
literature and anthropology took place as early as in the 1960s; in North 
America the turn accelerated in the 1980s. “Ironically, the narratologists 
embraced structuralist linguistics as their pilot-science just when its 
deficiencies were becoming apparent in the domain of linguistics,” 
Herman (2005) notes (p. 30). This key position of Saussurean linguistics 
meant that the structuralist or classical narratology was not primarily a 
hermeneutical enterprise; rather, its purpose was to proceed towards a 
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rigorous, neutral, scientific and descriptive model about the conditions of 
possibility to generate narratives. The formal and scientific attitude 
towards linguistic research generally embodied a neutral and curious 
attitude towards narratives as well. However, Barthes already in 1966 had 
introduced skepticism towards some narrative genres when he said 
categorically that “‘What takes place’ in a narrative is from the referential 
(reality) point of view literally nothing; ‘what happens’ is language alone, 
the adventure of language, the unceasing celebration of its coming” (p. 
124). No wonder then that this argument was soon translated into full 
scale skepticism towards the role of narrative in historiography.  
 In historiography, secondly, the narrativist turn may best be 
located in the 1970s and 1980s, following the publication of Hayden 
White’s Metahistory (1973), even though Louis Mink had already 
published some of his key essays in the late 1960s. White, and Mink 
(1987) before him, rendered historical narratives problematic by 
foregrounding the cognitive shaping role that narratives bear upon the 
contingent facts and details of the past. In contrast to the huge success of 
narratology, the narrativist historians never gained access to the 
mainstream of historiography. In contrast to the narrative scholars in 
social sciences, the narrativists never encouraged the collection and use of 
stories in writing historiography. Their focus of interest was rather the 
criticism of narrative in history writing. Instead of moving towards 
narratives and narrative historiography, some of the narrativist scholars 
have moved away from historiography towards the narrativist philosophy 
of history (Jenkins, 1995).  
 White (1987) himself points out that “narrative is not merely a 
neutral discursive form that may or may not be used to represent real 
events in their aspect as developmental process but rather entails 
ontological and epistemic choices with distinct ideological and even 
specifically political implications” (p. ix; emphasis added). It is clear that 
White is not thinking here of just any everyday, open, experience-oriented 
narrative but assumes the Aristotelian, closed and conventional—that is, 
the Proppian—narrative as his prototype. The first paragon of White’s 
particular “narrative” might indeed be the Platonic diegesis: a didactic 
story presented in simple past tense by a single narrator, with a strong 
closure and without any disturbing “imitation” or discourse (cf. Plato, 
1937, pp. 872−879; and White, 1981). “Narrative,” within this mode of 
thinking, is a distinct and clearly defined sub-system of language with 
essential and pre-determined qualities. Within this theory, speakers do not 
use the language but the language system uses the speakers. 
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 The third, broadly social scientific and philosophical turn is 
possibly the narrative turn that is most often recognized and celebrated in 
literature. Beginning from the early 1980s, narrative travelled into 
psychology, sociology, education, social work, theology, business and 
management, therapy, and medicine. In stark contrast to the structuralist 
narratology, this movement was characteristically hermeneutical in 
orientation, interpreting the meanings of the most various narratives. 
Whole research paradigms were revolutionized. Shaking up the reign of 
the experiment (psychology) and survey interview (sociology), the most 
various life narratives and recordings of storytelling in everyday 
situations became integral parts of research. “Although rarely mentioned, 
developments in technology were important in making narrative research 
a subfield in qualitative inquiry. Miniature recording technologies made 
detailed studies of everyday speech possible,” as Catherine Kohler 
Riessman notes (2008, p.15). Inspired by Jean-François Lyotard’s (1993) 
critique of the “grand narratives,” many scholars theoretically justified the 
collection and research of small and local narratives. The collection of 
stories from marginalized and suppressed groups was thus supported by 
the socio-political idea of “giving a voice” to these non-hegemonic 
groups. Departing sharply from the two earlier waves of the narrative 
turn, the narrative scholars typically understood their approach as more 
deeply humanistic than that of their predecessors’ work and the collection 
of stories, as such, was a useful and ethically valuable thing.  
 The range of possible appraisals thus changed with this third 
narrative turn. The psychologist Mark Freeman (1993) writes about his 
disappointment with formalist narratology and mainstream psychology 
because of their technicality, and outlines narrative studies as an 
existentialist counter-force to positivism. Jerome Bruner (1987, 1990) 
similarly criticizes the cognitive science of his time for focusing on mere 
information processing instead of the cultural workings of the human 
mind, positing his narrative approach as an alternative to this narrowly 
scientific cognitivism. The sociologist Ken Plummer (2001) shares the 
same orientation in outlining his project: “A major theme haunts this 
book. It is a longing for social science to take more seriously its 
humanistic foundations and foster styles of thinking that encourage the 
creative, interpretive story telling of lives—with all the ethical, political 
and self-reflexive engagements that it will bring” (p. 1). Carolyn Ellis, 
one of the pioneers of autoethnography, similarly explains her initial 
motivation: “My interest was in bringing the lived experience of emotions 
to social science research and doing research that was relevant to people’s 
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everyday lives” (Davis & Ellis, 2008, p. 283). Jens Brockmeier and Donal 
Carbaugh (2001) express this new attitude in a more philosophically- 
tuned language when they point out that “we can conceive of this anti-
Cartesian (narrative) orientation as part of an even more general post-
positivist movement” (p. 9). At this point narrative has, over its travels, 
diametrically changed its position as regards positivism and scientist 
rhetoric.  
 Nevertheless, it was not only the attitude towards narrative 
scholarship but towards narrative itself that was changed. From Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1984) onwards, narrative was often recognized 
as a healing entity, a method to resist the moral and personal 
fragmentation in modern life. “All too often,” Paul Atkinson and Sara 
Delamont (2006) complain, “narratives are collected and celebrated in an 
uncritical and unanalyzed fashion. It is a common failing, for instance, to 
imply that informants’ voices ‘speak for themselves’” (p. 166). Atkinson 
and Delamont, of course, document by their example both the expanded 
range of possible attitudes and some risks of assuming a too celebratory 
attitude. As they emphasize, “narratives are social phenomena. … Our 
stance towards such forms and genres of social life should be analytic, not 
celebratory” (p. 165). The other end of the continuum is aptly argued by 
James Pennebaker (1995), who says that “when individuals write or talk 
about emotional events, important biological changes occur. During 
confession in the laboratory, for example, talking about traumas brings 
about striking reductions in blood pressure, muscle tension, and skin 
conductance during or immediately after the disclosure” (p. 6). While 
encouraging the analytic attitude, narrative scholars need nevertheless to 
remain open to the option that narratives as such may, after all, have 
healing effects, at least on some occasions. 
 This picture of several overlapping and contrasting narrative turns 
becomes even more complex if we, fourthly, consider changed attitudes 
and changed narrative practices outside research work. Lyotard 
(1983/1993) already suggested the crises of such neutral and objective 
regimes of knowledge that professions and experts previously entertained. 
Contemporary media is full of narrative accounts of health and illness; 
correspondingly, the ads for alternative treatment most typically portray a 
photograph of an exposed person, a short story of his or her exposure to 
illness, and the miraculous recovery with product details. Media equally 
familiarize abstract public issues by asking concerned individuals to tell 
their personal stories on the issue. It should be justified to recognize such 
larger cultural and social trends and consider possible interdependences, 
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without subscribing to any kind of sociological reductionism. Jennifer 
Pierce (2003) argues that the “contemporary resurgence of interest in 
personal narratives dates from the 1960s and 1970s, originating in the 
Civil Rights movement and, even more powerfully, in second wave 
feminism. … Feminist sociologists, especially those who had been active 
in the second wave of the women’s movement, became interested in using 
personal narratives in their research as a way to give ‘voice’ to women’s 
experiences” (p. 307; on this, see also Riessman, 2008, pp.15−16). The 
growing interest in narrative studies, obviously, does not originate 
exclusively from the developments of narrative theory, nor is there one 
single origin or story-line available for narrative studies. Commercial 
media interest, technological innovations, and emancipatory social 
movements have thus equally contributed to the advance of the third 
narrative turn. 
 Thus far I have argued for the differences of attitudes and research 
orientations among the different narrative turns. It may be worth noticing 
that there has not been any strong methodological continuity between 
structuralist narratology and social research on narrative. For example, 
Gérard Genette’s (1980) sophisticated model of narrative modalities 
comprising the levels of narration, story, and narrative discourse, hardly 
ever travelled to the social sciences. There is still a characteristic 
difference of orientation between the literary scholars, who work with 
fiction, and social scientists, who work with non-fictional narrative 
materials. Literary scholars typically and predominantly identify 
themselves as narrative theorists—however “empirical” their work with 
fictional texts is—whereas social scientists more typically talk about 
narrative as a method or describe their own activity as “narrative 
analysis.” This obvious difference made more sense during the hegemony 
of formalist and structuralist theories in literature, when social scientists 
trying to make sense of the social world with the help of narratives were 
more or less alienated from the formalist focus on forms and narrative as 
mere textuality. Currently, this unwarranted division of work rather 
materializes in the form of the under-developed theory of narrative in 
social research. The old adversity to formalism, in turn, encourages ideas 
of reducing narrative analysis into various forms of content analysis.  
 Many prominent advocates of the third narrative turn read literary 
narratology extensively as well, the philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s 
monumental Time and Narrative (1984-1988) being the strongest case in 
point. The interest in literary theory has also been shared by such authors 
as the psychologists Donald Polkinghorne (1988) and Jerome Bruner 
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(1987). Ironically, this third wave has actualized Barthes’s abstract and 
universal notion of narrative—without subscribing to Barthes’s deductive, 
structuralist mode of analysis. The long-term continuity was most 
compellingly built upon the prototypical understanding of narrative in 
terms of the Proppian wonder tales. One significant but slowly accepted 
exception was Paul Ricoeur (1981), whose contribution to On Narrative 
already included a poignant critique of Propp and the structuralist, 
sequential reading of narratives. The psychologist Dan McAdams (1993) 
later discusses Ricoeur’s theory of human, narrative time, and then simply 
discards its complex understanding of time: “For many of us, time seems 
to move forward, and through its forward trajectory human beings 
change, grow, give birth, die, and so on. There is development and 
growth as well as death and decay” (p. 30). For Ricoeur, the great 
problem with Propp and structuralist theory of narrative was indeed the 
trivialization of time to a forward moving trajectory.  
 
Narrative as a Metaphor 
 
 Social scientists and psychologists did not primarily inherit their 
narrative methodologies from literature. The socio-linguistic model of 
William Labov and Joshua Waletzky (1967/1997) inscribed the belief in 
sequentially ordered sentences as the defining element of oral narratives. 
Broadly speaking, it has been this socio-linguistic heritage that has 
introduced most of the methodological rigor into social research of 
narrative (see, e.g., Riessman, 1990; Bamberg, 2004; Georgakopoulou, 
2007). As mentioned, in the social sciences there is a strong tendency to 
understand narrative only from the perspective of method. Within 
curricula, for example, “narrative analysis” typically appears as a slot 
within “qualitative research methods.” A social phenomenon (e.g., illness 
or aging) is then studied by “collecting stories on the phenomenon” and 
then “doing narrative analysis.” Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein 
(2009) take an explicitly different tack by theorizing the study of 
“narrative realities.”  
 But narrative in social research was originally not simply a 
methodological approach. Beginning from Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1984) 
influential After Virtue, narrative powerfully appeared as a new metaphor 
for phenomena of human life, mind, and action. For MacIntyre, “man” is 
“essentially a story-telling animal.” Narratives are not, however, merely 
linguistic phenomena thanks to “the narratives which we live out” (p. 
216). For Fischer (1987), humans indeed are “homo narrans” (p. xiii). 
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Jerome Bruner (1987) titles his famous article in terms of a metaphorical 
thought experiment, “Life as Narrative.” Theodor Sarbin (1986) is most 
explicit in his approach and suggests narrative as the “root metaphor” for 
psychology. George Rosenwald and Richard Ochberg (1992) title their 
influential volume “Storied Lives,” and Herman (2009b) moves the 
storied quality from lives to minds. 
 All these metaphors try to reshape our understanding of human 
life as an active meaning-making process. What the metaphoric approach 
argues, once and again, is that the cognitive tools in arranging past 
experience are not so different from the tools that are at use in planning 
the future or scanning the present moment. “Stories are not lived but 
told,” as Louis Mink notes (1987, p. 60). White (1999) echoes with: “This 
is because stories are not lived; there is no such thing as a real story. 
Stories are written, not found” (p. 9). On the level of representation, these 
critical claims are almost self-evidently true, at least for every social 
constructionist thinker. Nevertheless, the categorical distinction between 
“life” and “stories” reduces the whole issue to simplistic representation, 
pushing stories curiously outside life, as if they were only the products of 
some spectator who remained on the outside of life. The opposite way of 
looking at the issue would be to portray narratives as a necessary method 
of “doing living,” that is, trying to understand, in the middle of acting, 
thinking and feeling, what all of this is about (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Ricoeur, 
1984; Freeman, 2010; Brockmeier, in press).  
 However, from another angle, this disagreement is far from being 
as dramatic as it may seem to be. White’s comment can be found in an 
essay wherein he discusses troping as an unavoidable tool in approaching 
such ephemeral entities as the past—and “life” is notoriously such an 
indefinable entity. What he seems to argue is that cognition of abstract 
and intangible objects regularly proceeds through the variation of 
metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. What White seems to 
suggest, broadly, is that the tropes as such are forms of cognition and not 
forms of the “real.” This is again true if we think about fictional 
spectators, but if we look at the actual doing-of-everyday-life, the troping 
is always already there. Although these metaphors try to grasp something 
vitally important from a new perspective, there is always a significant 
residue, or a list of entirely unfitting issues. For these reasons, life is not a 
narrative, life is not reducible to “living out” a narrative, nor are minds or 
lives only and thoroughly storied. But the critics are probably wrong as 
far as they assume to have direct, non-metaphorical access to the “real,” 
or even more so, if they believe in witnessing an un-storied “real.”  
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 However, the metaphorical discourse on narrative might benefit 
from discarding the unnecessary totalizing elements of singular nouns. It 
is a different thing to think of life as “a narrative” than to think of it as 
narratively organized. Narrative identity may turn out to be a more 
flexible frame of ideas, if it is no longer understood as an identity in the 
form of a finished narrative. For a similar reason, I think that the 
philosopher Marya Schechtman (1996, 2007) cannot escape the criticism 
against narrative totalization (Strawson, 2004) by connecting her ideas of 
narrative and the self too closely to the idea of “having a narrative” (2007, 
p. 160). Personally, I cannot connect my own experience of myself into 
any such singular formulation of having a narrative. The plurality of 
stories and narrative processes is much more easily accessible.  
 
A New Prototype? 
 
 Arguably the most important change taking place over the past 15 
years may now be called the experiential turn in narrative theory. The 
Proppian prototype was challenged by such authors as Ricoeur (1981, 
1984), Pavel (1988), Ronen (1990) and Meir Sternberg (1992), at the 
same time as it was fairly popular in social sciences. One of the most 
prominent critics of the Proppian formalism and the understanding of 
narrative simply as a sequence of events was Monika Fludernik (1996) in 
her Towards a “Natural” Narratology. Fludernik makes two bold claims. 
She firstly suggests that the ephemeral and partly chaotic nature of 
“naturally occurring” everyday narratives must be taken seriously as a 
key building block of the narrative theory. Secondly, she suggests that 
experientiality rather than the sequence of events should be taken as the 
key defining feature of narrative.  
 In literary studies, the “postclassical” fascination with experience 
has at least two equally relevant elements. On the one hand, pure 
formalism has been replaced by more openly interpretive approaches, be 
they rhetorical, cognitive, or “unnatural” (Alber & Fludernik, 2010). On 
the other hand, the representations and workings of the human mind have 
been under intensive study. Even though originally titled as “cognitive 
narratology,” this orientation nevertheless has produced studies and 
questions with high relevance for the social research of narrative. Alan 
Palmer (2004) has theorized the representation of socially distributed 
minds in literature, challenging the idea of entirely private minds; Lisa 
Zunshine (2006) has written compellingly about the reasons to read 
fiction in her acclaimed Why We Read Fiction, and a number of authors 
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have explored the historical process of representing minds in literature 
(Herman, 2011). To give a crude summary, Zunshine seems to suggest 
that we read and attend to fiction (at least partly) in order to test and 
develop our mind-reading capacities in a fictionally safe environment. 
However, possibly the challenge is not at all limited to reading other 
minds. As Brockmeier has it, 
 
One of these assumptions is that the human condition is 
characterized by a hermeneutic imperative, to borrow Mark 
Freeman’s term . Following this imperative we don’t take our being 
in the world for granted but are continuously engaged in the 
business of making sense of it. (Brockmeier, in press) 
 
Visiting and playing with fiction, therefore, may after all be less about 
reading other minds than working with and through our own minds, and 
testing new mental tools in doing-living. Be that as it may, both 
interpretations suggest the relevance of fictional narratives in shaping the 
everyday narratives and everyday interpretative capacities (Herman, 
2009b). 
 A parallel discussion started a bit later in social research with the 
re-evaluation of the Labovian model of oral narrative. The sociolinguist 
Wendy Patterson (2008) criticizes the perspective of “narratives of 
events” and the focus on the sequence in the Labovian theory, and 
Corinne Squire (2008) accompanies her in the same volume by discussing 
“experience-centered” approaches to narrative. There is indeed a very 
perplexing paradox built into the Labovian model of oral narrative, a 
paradox that has been played out in contrasting ways in the history of 
narrative studies. Labov (1972) first foregrounds experience by claiming 
that “We define narrative as one method of recapitulating past 
experience… .” However, this functional interest in experience is next to 
marginalized by the straightforward claim for chronology: “by matching a 
verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) 
actually occurred” (p. 359). As Sternberg (1992) very poignantly 
comments, by this definition, most of the complex and non-referential 
narratives are excluded from narrativity. Rather than addressing the 
generic variety of narratives, Labov describes one particular sub-genre of 
narratives. The Labovian “narrative” was thus a good candidate for a new 
prototype of narrative.  
  The ambiguous contrast between “experience” and “sequence of 
clauses” matching “sequence of events” remains unresolved in the model. 
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“What, for example, makes chronology so critical that it becomes 
critical?” asks Sternberg (1992, p. 506). Even more so, the model affords 
very little interpretative power or analytic rigor to the study of 
“complicating action.” The experience, potentially, is analyzable with the 
help of the element of “evaluation” and its linguistic markers. The very 
element that defines his narrative receives no particular discussion in his 
presentation of the model (Labov, 1972, pp. 354–396). Most days are full 
of sequences of events that remain un-narrated. As Sternberg (1992) has 
it, such dynamic (Aristotelian) elements as surprise, curiosity, and 
suspense are vital for narratives and narration, and should therefore 
replace the criteria of sheer chronology or sequence of events in defining 
narratives (pp. 506–507). Sternberg’s terms cleverly introduce an intense 
understanding of temporality without suggesting anything like simple 
sequentiality.  
 The literary theorist David Herman (2009a) has recently 
reconsidered both Fludernik’s and Sternberg’s proposals and has 
furthermore formulated his position in terms of prototype theory. 
According to Herman, there are four equally basic elements of 
prototypical narrativity: (1) the situatedness of the narrative 
representations; (2) the sequence of events that is “cued” by these 
representations; (3) the aspect of world-making, world-disruption, and 
surprise in the narrative representation; and finally (4) the experience of 
living through this world disruption (p. 14). The situational aspect already 
locates the highly conventional wonder tales within a marginal area in 
terms of this prototype, and the fourth aspect of experientiality highlights 
many psychologically oriented narratives with a minor emphasis on 
sequence. The aspect of world disruption, already theorized earlier on by 
Jerome Bruner (1990, 1991) in terms of canonicity and breach, points out 
that mere sequence without the element of surprise and chaos does not 
constitute deep or prototypical narrativity. One could even argue that too 
straightforward a sequence in the wonder tales downplays the role of 
“cuing,” that is, the active role of the reader. What is remarkable in this 
new and theoretically explicit prototype is that it does not presume any 
literary precedence: that is, the claim that all narratives were 
transmutations of inherited literary or conventional modes. While the old 
prototype more or less directly suggested that all narratives are like 
wonder tales, Herman’s analytically refined prototype suggests that there 
can be all kinds of less-prototypical narratives (for example, by 
minimising the prominence of one or more basic elements 
independently). 
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  In terms of narrative genres, the model is relatively open and 
flexible. Most definitely, it is not built on either one hundred wonder tales 
(Propp) or on one category of oral narratives (Labov); instead, Herman’s 
basic argument claims that these elements characterize both fictional and 
everyday oral narratives. Because all four elements in the model can vary 
from thin to thick narrativity, the resulting combinations may equally be 
used to characterize narratives and narrative genres that deviate from the 
prototype in their individual ways.  
 Although this prototype includes a number of unanswered 
problems—such as the possible interconnectedness of these prototypical 
elements—it provides some substantial merits in comparison with 
previous prototypes, Proppian or Labovian. Firstly, it undeniably meets 
Monika Fludernik’s criterion for relevance since the model addresses key 
features of narrativity instead of playing with technical sequences of 
narrative clauses with minimal narrativity.  
 A further merit of the model resides in its capacity to foreground 
different types and categories of narrativity instead of presuming that 
“narrativity” is a qualitatively homogenous phenomenon. For a long time 
now, narrative theorists have emphasized the idea that “narrative” is not 
simply a yes-or-no phenomenon but benefits from understanding it from 
the perspective of more or less thick or thin narrativity (e.g., Fludernik, 
1996; Abbott, 2002). Herman’s prototype now suggests that it is entirely 
possible to envision qualitatively different kinds of narrativity. News 
reports, for example, typically foreground the third element of surprise 
and world-disruption but often leave the element of experience thin or 
entirely contingent. Even the individual elements may possibly lead to 
different kinds of narrativity. The second element, Herman says (2009a), 
implies that the representation “cues interpreters to draw inferences about 
a structured time-course of particularized events” (p. 14). How much 
emphasis shall we put on the “cuing” and how much on the “structured 
time-course”? It is not uncommon that people usually write life stories 
which proceed in a strict temporal, chronological order, while on many 
occasions, the orally rendered or more artistic stories proceed in a much 
more chaotic and fragmented order. The old, sequential understanding 
emphasizes the higher narrativity of the first case, while Herman’s 
wording suggests that the mental challenge constituted by merely “cuing” 
the order might itself be an important element of experience of thick 
narrativity—at least for many of us.     
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Aspects of Travel 
 
 I set out to question the overly general and easily too optimistic 
figure of one narrative turn. The metaphor of travel, in its all potential 
rambling multiplicity and possibility to visit the same sites several times, 
and as a different person, serves my analytic purpose particularly well. 
The multiplicity of travels and travellers is at the core of my argument. 
Deviating from my earlier use of the figure “travelling concept” of 
narrative (Bal, 2002; Hyvärinen, 2006), I have introduced two other 
significant travellers: the prototype and the metaphor of narrative. 
Ironically, the most reluctant traveller has arguably been the theory of 
narrative, and concomitantly the theoretically grounded and rounded 
concepts of narrative. 
 Two other travellers, instead, obviously have performed much 
better. Some extensively read and discussed narrative studies seem to 
have had a prototype effect, contributing to prototypical ideas about what 
narratives at root more typically are. These prototypical models—for 
example, the Proppian wonder tales and the Labovian oral narrative—
have characteristically travelled swiftly across disciplinary boundaries. In 
particular, the Russian wonder tales were able to epitomize the narrative 
essence and the access to the narrative grammar, and even sponsor many 
of the structuralist definitions of narrative as representations of sequences 
of events. 
 The successes of these prototypical travels—both the Proppian 
and Labovian versions—indicate a theoretical failure to meet Roland 
Barthes’s (1977) old call to understand narrative as “a prodigious variety 
of genres” (p. 79). Historically, one of the hardest problems has been to 
accept the variety and fragmentation of everyday oral narration 
(Hyvärinen et al., 2010; Georgakopoulou, 2007). Decades-long debates 
on the narrative genres of historiography, and the overall difficulty in 
balanced analysis of the potential ideological implications that different 
narratives (may) have, suffer gravely from the continuous replacement of 
the nuanced theory of narrative genres by the overly abstract and 
essentialist arguments which find their point of departures in the inherited 
narrative prototypes (see, e.g., Strawson, 2004; Hyvärinen, 2012).  
 In the language suggested by Hayden White (1999), these 
arguments and studies once and again mobilize the mental figure of 
metonymy by inviting one quite narrow category of narrative to represent 
all narratives and narrativity in general. The move I suggest—the more 
nuanced study of narrative genres as a cure to this problem (again 
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following White’s discussion of tropes)—mobilizes a more rounded, 
synecdochic understanding of narrativity in all of its boundless variety.  
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